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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN H. JORDAN, 
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent, 
vs. 
COCA-COLA BOTTLING COM-
pANY OF UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\ 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7347 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the defendant from a verdict 
and judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the 
defendant in the sum of $500.00, rendered by the Third 
District Court in a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover 
for damages claimed to have been sustained by him as a 
result of drinking from a bottle of contaminated Coca-
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Cola. Defendant also appeals from the Order of District 
Court denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
In this brief, we shall refer to the parties as they 
a:ppeared in the Court below. 
THE FACTS 
It is admitted by the pleadings that the defendant 
corporation is a Utah corporation, and is engaged in 
the bottling, distribution and sale of a soft drink generally 
known as Coca-Cola. (R. 6, 7 & 19.) 
At the trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to the 
effect that he was an employee of the American Smelting 
and Refining Company (R. 78) and that on or about 
the 5th day of October, 1948, he purchased a bottle of 
Coca-Cola from a Coca-Cola Dispensing Machine, located 
on his employer's premises. (R. 79.) 
The plaintiff drank from the bottle of Coca-Cola, 
what he described as ''a big slug'' of the beverage and 
at that time he discovered a large fly in his mouth. 
(R. 80.) About an hour later the plaintiff claims he 
became sick and nauseated and was sick intermittently 
for three days thereafter, suffering from nausea and 
diarrhea. (R. 81, 83.) 
The plaintiff's Exhibit ''A,'' a bottle of Coca-Cola 
containing two flies, was identified by the plaintiff as 
the bottle from which he drank, and was received in 
evidence by the Court. Plaintiff further testified that 
after he had purchased the bottle he removed the cap, 
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and that the cap came off "fairly hard" and about the 
san1e as caps from other bottles, '"'hich he had removed 
on the same day. (R. 89.) On cross-exa1nination the 
plaintiff adn1itted that he did not consult a doctor and 
that he did not miss any time from 'vork. (R. 905.) He 
further testified on cross-examination that he svvallowed 
one fly and that he discovered another fly in his mouth, 
vvhich he expectorated and then put back in the bottle, 
and that there vvas a third fly remaining in the bottle. 
(R. 93, 99.) 
The testimony of the plaintiff, as to spitting out the 
fly after drinking from the bottle of Coca-Cola, was 
corroborated by the testimony of two fellow employees, 
Keith Wiseman (R. 99, 101) and Leslie L. Cramer 
(R. 112, 113.) 
George D. Walker, a truck driver in the employ of 
the defendant, testified that the plant of the- American 
Smelting and Refining Company was on his route (R .. 
103), and that he served the particular dispensing 
machine from which the plaintiff received the contamin-
ated bottle of Coca-Cola. He testified that the dispensing 
machine was the type known as Venderlator number 242, 
and that that type of machine would hold ten cases of 
Coca-Cola. The machine had 22 racks, each holding 11 
bottles of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola was purchased frorn 
the machine by inserting a nickel in the slot provided 
for that purpose, which tripped a mechanism and auto-
matically served a cold bottle of Coca-Cola. The machine 
also had a reserve compartment, holding 4 cases of 
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Coca-Cola. In addition to the reserve compartment in 
the vending machine, additional reserve stocks of Coca-
Cola were kept in the office of the American Smelting 
and Refining Company's foreman. Guards employed 
by. the refining company loaded reserve stocks into the 
dispensing machine on weekends. (R. 103.) 
Les Anderson, Kelsey Rosander, or one of the 
guards employed by the American Smelting and Refining 
Company serviced the Coca-Cola dis:pensing 1nachine on 
the night shift. 
Bottles of Coca-Cola stored in reserve in the fore-
man's office were not locked up. They were stacked by 
the forman's desk. (R. 104.) The Coca-Cola delivered 
to the American Smelting and Refining Company was 
actually sold to the American Smelting and Refining 
Company. It was the custom for the witness to service 
the machine every day. (R.106.) 
On cross-examination, Walker testified that the dis-
pensing machine was leased to the American Smelting 
and Refining Company and that the Coca-Cola was sold 
to the American Smelting and Refining Company in bulk. 
He reiterated on cross-examination that Coca-Cola might 
be removed from the reserve compartment of the vending 
machine to the mechanism of the vending machine by 
employees of the .American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany. (R. 107.) The defendant corporation had nothing 
to do with money taken from the vending machine. 
(R. 108.) 
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Les Anderson, head guard for the American S1nelting 
and Refining Company, testified that he, together "\vith 
another employee of American Smelting' and Refining 
Company, \vould collect the money fron1 the -vending 
machine and would refill the -vending 1nachine vvhen nec-
essary, which was about once a week. (R. 109.) The "\vit-
ness, together \Yith Rosander and the g'uards en1ployed 
by the American Smelting and Refining Company, had 
the keys to the dis:pensing machine and some of then1 
filled the vending machine with Coca-Cola on the night 
shift at American Smelting and Refining Company as 
a part of their job. 
The evidence on behalf of the defendant was to 
the effect that the most modern and best possible equip~ 
ment was utilized by the defendant corporation in the 
washing of bottles, bottling of Coca-Cola, and inspection 
of the finished product; and that defendant corporation 
utilized every scientific inv~ntion known to man to assure 
that the product distributed by it for sale on the public 
market would be pure and wholesome. 
Peter A. Hanes, the maintenance man for the defend-
ant corporation, testified that he had been employed in 
that capacity by the defendant for the four years immedi-
ately preceding, and that he had been an employee of 
the defendant for seven years all together. Prior to that 
time he had worked for the Doctor Pepper Company, 
another bottler of soft drinks, for five years, also in the 
capacity of maintenance man. (R. 116.) The witness 
was familiar with the Bottler's Industrial Manual, a 
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trade journal of the bottling industry, which publication 
he received regularly. He had also visited bottling plants 
in other parts of the country and had observed their 
operation. 
The witness identified the defendant's Exhibit 1, as 
a diagram of the Meyer-Dumore Washing Machine which 
was the type used by the defendant in its bottle washing 
operation. He testified that the washing machine \vas 
located in the front part of the defendant's plant in a 
room with a cement floor, plaster walls painted "\vhite 
and screened windows. The room was regularly s:prayed 
with disinfectants. (R. 117.) 
Mr. Hanes explained in some detail the defendant's 
bottle washing process, which can be briefly summarized 
as follows: 
As the bottles enter the washing machine they first 
go into a rinse tube, which tube goes up into the bottle and 
rinses it for four seconds with water heated to a tempera-
ture of about 70°. The rinsing process is repeated at 
the next rack, making two rinses for each bottle. 
After rinsing, the bottles proceed to the number 1 
caustic tank, which contains a 3% caustic solution, heated 
to a temperature of 110°. The bottles are in caustic 
tank No. 1 for four minutes. When the bottles are re-
moved from the caustic tank the caustic is drained out 
of the bottles and the bottles continue in to another tank 
heated to a temperature of 150° and containing a 2% 
caustic solution where the bottles remain for an addi-
tional period of four minutes. From the second caustic 
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tank the bottles proceed to still another caustic tank con-
taining a solution of 1% raustic at a ten1perature of 130° 
and ag·ain they are bathed in the caustic solution for four 
minutes. ....\.fter being drained the bottles go through a 
fresh "\Vater tank, heated to a ten1perature of 100° vvhere 
they are thoroughly rinsed for a period of three and a 
half to four minutes. The bottles are again drained and 
then they go over to the first set of bottle brushes, which 
are outside brushes. 
The bottles then go to the ''first rinse,'' where they 
receive an inside rinse. The rinsing tube shoots water 
into the bottle at 60 pounds pressure cleaning the bottle 
on the inside as it goes u:p and down, and remains there 
shooting water for a period of four seconds. After leav-
ing the rinse tube, bottles come to the first inside brushes, 
which are water lubricated. The brushes go inside the 
bottles and brush the bottoms of the bottles on the 
inside at 60 pounds pressure and at 1200 revolutions per 
minute. Water goes through the center of the brushes 
as they revolve. The brushes are inside the bottle a 
period of about 4 seconds. The brushing process is 
repeated by a second set of brushes. From the brushing 
process the bottles go through another set of rinses like 
the ones heretofore described. After two more rinses 
the bottles go past the visual inspector and on to the 
filling machine. 
As bottles pass the inspector they are in a single 
line. The inspector is aided by a fluorescent light which 
has a non-glare plate behind it. It is the job of the 
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ins:pector to examine the bottles as they go by the inspec-
tion light and to remove any defective bottles. After 
inspection the bottles go to the syruper where syrup is 
deposited in the bottles. While the bottle is in the 
syruper, it is protected from contamination by "a little 
collar about 2 inches in diameter," \vhich comes down 
over the bottle while it is being syruped. The bottle then 
receives the charge of carbonated water and during this 
process it is similarly protected from contamination. 
From there the bottle goes to the crowner, where it is 
capped. ·After being capped the bottle moves to the 
mixer where it is turned upside down and S'pun at 
approximately three thousand revolutions per minute. 
The bottle then proceeds to the automatic electric eye 
inspecting machine. That machine automatically rejects 
any bottle having any defect, or containing any foreign 
substance. 
Hanes further testified that water used in the bottling 
process is regular city water, specially treated and 
filtered, and that from the time such water is treated 
until it is placed in the individual bottles of Coca-Cola, 
it is always in a sealed container and never exposed to 
flies or insects. 'The syrup used in the Coca-Cola also is 
in sealed containers during the entire bottling process. 
The syrup is twice screened, once as it leaves the barrel 
in which it was received by defendant, and again just 
before it goes into the individual bottles. 
Hanes further testified that the automatic electric 
eye inspecting machine had been tested by running 
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through it test bottles of Coca-Cola, containing various 
foreign substances. 
Defendant's Exhibit 6 is a bottle of Coca-Cola con-
taining a small 12 shot, defendant's Exhibit 5 is a bottle 
of Coca-Cola containing a ·piece of cork, and defendant's 
Exhibit 4 is a bottle of Coca-Cola containing a bristle 
from a brush. ..~..\11 of those bottles had been passed 
through the inspecting machine many tin1es and in every 
case the inspecting machine had rejected those test 
bottles. ( R. 118 to 128.) 
Hanes further testified that the equipment used by 
the defendant was the most up-to-date and modern 
equipment in use in the bottling industry, and that there 
was nothing better or more modern any place. In his 
experience he had never seen a finer bottling plant than 
the defendant's. Hanes also testified that the brushes 
used in the bottle washing process were inspected twice 
a day for wear and tear. 
Raymond Wilmert, a field engineer for the Radio 
Corporation of America, with four years of training at 
the University of Illinois and 20 years experience with 
Western Electric Company and R.C.A. (R. 138-9), testi-
fied as follows : 
R. C.A. was a seller of bottle inspecting machines 
(hereinafter referred to as B.I.M.) and there was a B.I.M. 
machine installed at the defendant's plant and it was 
there in September and October of 1948. (R. 139.) The 
operation of the B.I.M. was described as follows: 
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At the time the bottles of Coca-Cola pass through 
the B.I.M. the bottles are standing still, but the fluid 
vv!thin them is whirling. Any sediment, p.arti~les of dust, 
or any foreign substance in the bottle of Coca-Cola will 
interrupt the hean1 of light and cause the reject mechan-
ism on the B.I.M. to operate and "kick'' the bottle out 
of the line. If anything goes wrong with the B.I.M. it 
rejects all bottles rather than permitting defective bottles 
to pass through. The most difficult part of the task of 
maintaining the machine is to keep it adjusted so that 
it doesn't reject too many bottles. 
The B.I.M. receives a maintenance inspection once 
per month, which inspection is performed by the witness. 
During the tune he had ·performed the maintenance of 
this machine, he had never found it so out of order that 
it would not kick out 'any bottles having foreign matter 
in them, and it would be impossible for the machine to 
get out of order in that manner. 
Mr. Wilmert further testified very positively that 
the Plaintiff's Exhibit "A," which was the bottle of 
Coca-Cola containing flies and other foreign matter 
from which the plaintiff drank, could not possibly go 
through the inspecting machine without being rejected. 
He also testified that he had many times seen defendant's 
Exhibits 4, 5 and 6, test bottles used by the defendant 
and containing various foreign articles which have here-
tofore been described, :pass through the machine on many 
occasions and that in every instance the machine had 
rejected them. The witness testified that he knew of 
no better machine on the market than the one used by the 
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defendant, and that he had never seen a better or 1nore 
up-to-date bottling plant. (R. 140-143.) 
On cross-examination, l\lr. \V.ihnert testified that the 
B.I.M. 'vould reject bottles 'Yith bubbles (R. 144) that 
the B.I.M. "~ould reject a bottle containing a fly in the 
botton1 covered 'vith syrup (R. 145.) On redirect exam-
ination he testified that 'vhenever the B.I.!1:. failed it 
rejected all bottles, and it 'vas necessary for the defend-
ant to suspend bottling operations until repairs could 
be effected. (R. 146.) 
Dr. Louis R. Curtis, a bacteriologist and sanitarian 
had had four years training at Cornell University, a 
doctor's degree in bacteriology and chemistry, experience 
as a bacteriologist for the Dairymen's League in New 
York State, two years of service with the National Dairy 
in Baltimore, Maryland, and three years experience as 
Chief Sanitarian in Salt Lake City (R. 147), testified 
that the defendant's building was modern, well planned 
and the last word in construction (R. 148); that it would 
be impossible for a bottle to go through the defendant's 
washing machine with three large flies in it (R .. 149); 
that the hot caustic baths would tend to dissolve any 
organic matter present in the bottle (R. 150) ; and that 
it was highly improbable that any bottle could go through 
the defendant's washing process and still contain flies 
in the condition of those contained in the bottle known 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A." 
J. T. Holding, a health officer of Salt Lake City 
Corporation for six years, em·ployed as an inspector of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
food and drinks, testified that it vvas his duty, among 
others, to inspect the establishments of bottling com-
panies, and that from March through September, 1948, 
he had inspected the defendant's plant regularly. (R. 
154.) The inspection was a general inspection, and in-
cluded ins·pection for rodents and insects. and inspection 
of windows and toilets. In September, 1948, screens at 
the defendant's plant were up, and were well kept. (R. 
155.) The defendant's p·lant was one of the best beverage 
plants in the city. It had good equipment and was well 
kept up. He had never had any complaint of the defend-
ant's plant and had never seen insects in the defendant's 
plant. (R. 162.) His inspection records showed no flies 
present in defendant's plant. (R. 156). 
At this point in the case both parties rested and 
the defendant moved for a directed verdict. After con-
siderable argument and discussion, leave was given to 
the plaintiff to reopen his case for the purpose of showing 
that the contaminated bottle from which the plaintiff 
drank was actually bottled by the defendant corporation. 
(R. 162.) 
Kelsey Rosander, an employee of the American 
Smelting and Refining Company (R. 164), testified that 
when the dispensing machine at the American Smelting 
and Refining Plant was dry, he put reserve stocks of 
Coca-Cola into the machine. He and Les Anderson had 
keys to the machine. (R. 165). On cross-examination he 
testified that the Chief Watchman at the American 
Smelting and Refining plant has a key to the vending 
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machine, and when the Chief \~\Tatchman was not ·present 
other employees of the .. A.merican Sn1elting and Refining 
Company used the Chief ,V-atchman's key. (R. 169.) 
Frank Baer, an employee of A1nerican Smelting 
and Refining Company (R. 170), testified that it w~s 
his duty to O.K. bills to the defendant company and that 
he never O.K. 'd any bills to any other Coca-Cola Com-
pany (R. 171.) On cross-examination he testified that 
American Smelting and Refining Company bought and 
received Coca-Cola from the defendant Company and 
that American Smelting and Refinery Company leased 
the vending machine. 
Les Anderson, another employee of American Smelt-
ing and Refining Company testified that he, Ros-ander 
and the guards had a key to the vending machine and 
that all together 14 people had access to the vending 
machine. (R. 175, 177.) 
George Walker testified on cross-examination that 
at times when he had been loading the vending machine 
men at the American Smelting and Refining Company 
plant had come to him and exchanged bottles of Coca-
Cola, asking to receive a cold bottle in place of a warm 
bottle. vVhen such exchanges were made the warm bottles 
were loaded into the machine. (R. 181.) Mr. Walker 
did not know where the men got the warm bottles. (R. 
182.) On redirect examination, he testified that he never 
examined the warm bottles to see whether or not they 
had been opened. (R. 182.) 
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Donald A. Carmichael, manager of the defendant 
company (R. 183), testified that there were Coca-Cola 
Bottling Companies at Ogden, Pays·on, Logan and Vernal 
and that those p~lants were not owned by the defendant 
company. He further testified that Coca-Cola comes 
into the Salt Lake territory from other territories. 
(R. 184.) 
In view of the fact that the verdict was for the 
plain tiff, we recognize that all conflicts in evidence must 
be, for purposes of this appeal, resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff and that all facts necessary to support the 
verdict must be accepted as true if supported by credible 
evidence. For purposes of this brief, we assume as true 
that the plaintiff received a contaminated bottle of Coca-
Cola from the vending machine at the American Smelting 
and Refining Plant; that he drank from the same, and 
that by reason thereof he became ill as described by him. 
On the other hand, the evidence on the part of the 
defendant to the effect that the defendant's pJant was 
equipped with the most modern and best ~equipment for 
bottling and distributing Coca-Cola, and that every 
human and mechanical precaution had been observed 
in order to insure that the beverage produced by the 
defendant company would be pure and wholesome, must 
be accepted as true, since such evidence is powerfully 
corroborated by the testimony of disinterested experts 
and is uncontradicted in any way, shape or form. It 
must also be accepted as true that when Coca-Cola bottled 
by the defendant corporation was delivered to the Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Company Plant, it passed 
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from the possession of the defendant corporation and into 
the possession and control of .. A.1nerican Smelting and 
Refining Company and its en1ployees. The defendant 
corporation did not haYe any control 'vhatsoever over the 
bottle n1arked as ·plaintiff's Exhibit ".A .. ' ' at the tinll~ 
plaintiff purchased it. It had been delivered to the Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Company's plant at son1e 
time ·previous to the incident and was under the con1plete 
control of the Alnerican Smelting and Refining Company 
and its employees. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Defendant assigns as error the following Orders and 
Rulings of the Trial Court and actions on the part of 
counsel for the plaintiff and actions of the jury: 
1. The Court erred in denying the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict. 
2. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant'8 
requested instruction No. A. 
3. The Court erred in refusing to give the defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 1 in the language 
requested. 
4. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No. 5 in the language requested. 
5. The Court erred in giving instruction No. 6. 
6. The verdict is contrary to law and is unsupported 
by the evidence. 
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7. Counsel for the plaintiff "\Vas guilty of misconduct 
amounting to prejudicial error by continually referring 
to other law suits against this defendant, with the appar-
ent purpose of causing the jury to believe that the defend-
ant company was quite frequently in litigation of a 
similar nature and therefore was guilty frequently of 
putting contaminated Coca-Cola on the market. (R. 132, 
144, :and 159.) 
8. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ·THE D·E-
FENDANT; BUT, ON THE· CONTRARY, THE REC-
ORD SHOWS AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 
DEFENDAN~T EXERCISED THE HIGHEST POS-
SIBLE DEGREE OF CARE. 
The argument under this :point will cover assign-
ments of error numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. 
A. THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE CONTAM· 
INATED BOTTLE OF COCA-COLA FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF DRANK 
WAS BOTTLED BY THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION. 
It is the position of the defendant, insisted upon by 
it throughout the trial, that the plaintiff wholly failed 
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to sho'Y that the defendant bottled the bottle of Coca-Cola 
from which plaintiff drank. .A.pparently the trial judge 
agreed with the Yie'Y of the defendant at the time both 
parties rested. Ho,vever, when the trial court indicated 
his inclination to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict, plaintiff requested and \Yas granted leave to re-
open his case for the purpose of sho,ving that the con-
taminated bottle really '\Yas bottled by the defendant 
company. 
Taking the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff's 
view, we find that the defendant did regularly sell to 
the American Smelting and Refining Company, Coca-
Cola in case lots. We also have the testimony of Frank 
Baer, an employee· of American Smelting and Refining 
Company, that it was his duty to O.K. bills to the defend-
ant company, and that he never O.K. 'd any bills to any 
other Coca-Cola company. That constitutes the entire 
evidence in the record which in any way tends to indicate 
that the defendant bottling company bottled the bottle 
of Coca-Cola from which the plaintiff drank. 
On the other hand, there is the testimony of Mr. 
Carmichael, the manager of the defendant company, to 
the effect that there are other Coca-Cola bottling com-
panies in Utah, located in Ogden, Payson, Logan and 
Vernal, and that such Coca-Cola bottling establishments 
are in no way connected with the defendant. Mr. Car-
michael also testified that bottles of Coca-Cola bottled 
by other plants frequently came into the territory served 
by the defendant company. · 
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The testimony of Frank Baer does not exclude the 
possibility of American Smelting and Refining Company 
having purchased Coca-Cola from other bottling estab-
lishments. Other employees of the American Smelting 
and Refining Company might well have O.K. 'd such 
bills ; or transactions, with other Coca-Cola companies, 
might have been handled on a cash basis. Moreover, there 
is the testimony of George Walker, an employee of the 
defendant company who testified for the ·plaintiff, that 
on occasions when he was loading the vending machine 
at the American Smelting and Refining plant, he fre-
quently exchanged bottles of cold Coca-Cola for warm 
bottles of Coca-Cola which were brought to him by 
employees, and that he did not know where these warm 
oottles of Coca-Cola came from. Very possibly such 
warm bottles of Coca-Cola could have been purchased 
from dealers who received them from bottlers other than 
the defendant. Whether the bottle from which plaintiff 
drank was one of those bottled by defendant, or whether 
it originated elsewhere, cannot be determined from the 
record. In this case, the plaintiff failed, ·at the very 
outset, to carry his burden. Not only did he fail to show 
fault as we shall hereafter point out, but he absolutely 
failed even to show that the bottle in question was hottled 
by the defendant company. 
B. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Assuming, without in any way conceding, that there 
is sufficient evidence in the record to. justify ·an inference 
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that the defendant 'Yas the bottler of the contaminated 
bottle of Coca-Cola, there is absolutely no evidence of 
any fault on the p·art of the defendant in its bottling 
process. Plaintiff's entire case rests upon the fact that 
there were three flies and son1e other foreign rna terial in 
the bottle of Coca-Cola from "\Vhich he drank. There is 
not the slightest evidence as to "~hen or how these im-
purities got into the bottle of Coca-Cola. One searches 
the record in vain for any hint as to any delict or short-
coming on the part of the defendant in its bottling pro-
cess. 
It is a fundamental princip·le of the law of negligence, 
too well established to require citation of authority, that 
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the defendant was guilty of some 
f', 
act or omission causing the injury to the plaintiff. It is 
equally well established that negligence or wrong cannot 
be inferred from the mere fact of injury. This rule is 
well stated in 38 Am. Jur. 983-4, Negligence, Sec. 290, 
where it is said : 
''Apart from the rule of res ipsa loquitur, 
negligence cannot be assumed from the mere fact 
of ,an accident and an injury. The mere fact that 
an accident happens is not evidence of negligence. 
Thus the mere fact t,hat an injury has been sus-
tained, if it can in an;y practical way be cons~idered 
apart from other circumstances, certainly will not 
give rise to an inference or presumption that the 
injury is due to the negligence of one who is made 
defenda.nt to an action based thereon. Clearly, 
mere proof that an accident injurious to the 
plaintiff has occurred does not justify a verdict 
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or judg1nent imp1osing liability therefor UJP'On the 
defendant. If the evidence .does not show any 
negligence on the part of the defendant, there can 
be no recovery, regardless of the freedom of the 
plaintiff from any negligence on his ·part. The 
cause of .an injury must be connected with the one 
sued for damages resulting therefrom, by direct 
evidence either that it w·as his act, or t.hat it w·as 
under his control, before it can be presu.med that 
he w~as negligent. If the evidence does not show 
any negligence on the part of the defendant, there 
can be no recovery, no matter how free from 
negligence the facts show t~he plaintiff to be. The 
evidence must point to the fact that the defendant 
w.as guilty of negligence. A careful analysis of 
the better-considered decisions shows that negli-
gence will not be inferred or presumed from the 
mere fact of injury when that fact is as consistent 
with an inference that the injury was unavoid-
able as it is with negligence; therefore, if it be 
left in doubt what the cause of the accident was, 
or if it may as well be attributable to the ~act of 
God or unk:now·n causes as to negligence, there is 
no such presumption/' (Italics added.) 
In the case of ·Co.ca-'Cola Bottling Company v-s. Row·-
lan, 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66 S.W. 2d 272, the facts were very 
similar to those in the case at bar. In that case the plain-
tiff had :purchased a bottle of Coca-Cola from a news-
stand and had taken it to a restroom to drink. She re-
turned to the newsstand some ten minutes later with 
the bottle of Coca-Cola about two-thirds full and with a 
dead and decomposed mouse in it. The last previous de-
livery of Coca-Cola to the newsstand had been about 
six days before that incident. The Coca-Cola was kept 
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in a storeroom until it \Ya8 needed in the cooler for sale. 
In that ease, as in the case at bar, the only eYidence of 
negligence \Yas the presence of tht> foreign matter in 
the bottled beverage. 
In reversing a judgn1ent for the plaintiff, the Ten-
nessee Court said: 
'' '\Tithout discussing the facts as described by 
the record further, we are of the opinion that the 
plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant 
\Yas guilty of any negligence in the matter of 
bottling Coca-Cola. * * * We are constrained to 
reach the conclusion that there is no proof of 
negligence. '' 
The Tennessee Court also quoted 'vith approval the 
following language from Crigger vs~ Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.\V. 155: 
''However exacting the duty or high the de-
gree of care to furnish pure foods, beverages, and 
medicines, we believe with Judge Cooley as ex-
pressed in Brown v_s. Marshall, * * *. ( 47 Mich. 
576, 11 N. W. 392), that negligence is a necessary 
elen~ent in t.he right of action, and the better 
authorities have not gone so far as to dis'J}1ense 
with actual negligence as a p~rerequisite to the 
liability. In fact, there is no logical basis of lia-
bility for personal injury without some negligent 
act of omission. '' (Italics added.) 
In the case of Ash vs. Child's Dining Ha.ll ·Co., 231 
Mass. 86, 12 N.E. 396, the plaintiff, a guest in the de-
fendant's restaur·ant, ate a p.iece of berry pie. A small 
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tack was imbedded in the pie, and the plaintiff 'vas in-
jured by eating it. The pie was baked by the defendant. 
In holding that there was no evidence of negligence, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said: 
''There is nothing in the record from which 
it can he inferred that the harm to the plaintiff 
resulted from any failure of duty on the part of 
the defendant. The precise cause of her injury 
is left to conjecture. It may as reasonably be 
attributed to a condition for which no liability 
attached to the defendant as to one for which it is 
responsible. Under such circumstances the plain-
tiff does not sustain the burden of proving tor-
tious conduct upon the defendant by a fair pre-
ponderance of all the evidence, and the verdict 
ought to be directed accordingly.'' 
To the same effect see : 
O'Brien VB. Louis K. Liggett ·Company, (Mass.) 152 
N.E. 57; 
Ho.rn &; H. Baking Company vs. Leiber, 25 F. 2d 
449, 28 N.C.C.A. 189; 
Werner vs. Armour ~& Co., 320 Pa. 440, 183 A. 48. 
In th·e case of Enloe vs. ·Charlotte Coca-~Cola Bottling 
Co-., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S.E. 582, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina announced the rules governing cases of 
this sort in that jurisdiction. Proposition No. 4 stated 
by the Court was as follows : 
''That the wholesomeness of ·the product which 
proximately results in injury to the consumer 
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must be traced to the negligence of the manu-
facturer, bottler, or packer. Keith vs. Tobacco 
Company, :207 ~. C. G43, 178 S. E. 90. '' 
This rule has subsequently been reiterated and fol-
lowed in a number of subsequent North Carolina cases. 
See: 
JfcLeod vs .. Lexington Coca-'Cola Bottling Company, 
(N.C.) 194 S.E. 82. 
Thompson vs. Dr. Pepper Bottlers Corporation, 
(N.C.) 8 S.E. 2d 234. 
Davis vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Asheville, 
(N.C.) 44 S.E. 2d 337. 
It is submitted that the foregoing cases set forth 
the true and generally accepted rule, and they represent 
a particularized application to a case of this sort, of the 
general rule, well established in this jurisdiction, that 
proof of injury is no proof of negligence. 
C. THE DOCTRINE oF Res l'[J1Sa Loquitur rs NOT AP-
PLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The trial court apparently proceeded upon the 
theory that this was a res ip~sa loquitur case, and in so 
doing committed prejudicial error resulting from a mis-
conception of that doctrine. It is well established in this 
jurisdiction, as we shall hereafter more particularly 
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point out, and it is the view of the better reasoned judi-
cial opinions, and of the best text writers, that the doc-
trine of res ~p~sa loquitur can apply only in those cases 
where the defendant had the exclusive control of the in-
strumentality causing the harm, at the time of the in-
jury. As has been pointed out in the statement of facts 
contained in this brief, the bottle of Coca-Cola from 
which the plaintiff drank, was not in the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant, but, on the contrary, was com-
pletely beyond the control of the defendant, and was in 
the sole custody, :possession and control of the American 
Smelting & Refining Company until it was purchased 
by the plaintiff, at which time it came within the plain-
tiff's exclusive control. These facts are established by 
the plaintiff's own evidence and cannot be doubted. 
The rule is stated thus in 38 Am. Jur., 989, Negli-
gence, Sec. 295 : 
''The conclusion to be drawn from the cases 
as to what constitutes the rule of res ips~a liquitur 
is that pvroof that the thing which caused the in-
jury to the p~laintiff was under the control and 
management of the defendant, and that the occur-
rence was such as in the ordinary course of things 
would not happen if those who had its control or 
management used proper care, affords sufficient 
evidence, or, as sometimes stated by the courts 
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explana-
tion by the defendant, that the injury arose from 
or was caused by the defendant's want of care." 
(Italics added.) 
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And at pages 996-7, Sec. 300, of the sa1ue reference, 
it is said: 
··It i.s essent,:az to the .application of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loqnitur that it ap~pear that the 
instrunlentality which produced the injury com-
plained of was at the t·iJne of the injury under 
the management o·r control of the defendant or 
of his agents and servants. \When, ho~vever, it 
appears that the victim had exclusive contrpl of 
the offending thing, no imputation of resiP~onsi­
bility ·1v·ill attach to the defendant. It is not only 
necessary to show that the offending instrumen-
tality was under the management of the defend-
ant, but it must be shown that it proximately 
caused the injury, or that the injury was caused 
by some act incident to the control of the instru-
mentality. The doctrine does not ~apply where 
the agency causing the accident was not under 
the sole and exclusive control of the person sought 
to be charged with the injury." (Italics added.) 
And at page 1000, Sec. 303, it is further said : 
''The res ipsa loquitur rule does not apply 
where it appears that the accident was due to a 
cause beyond the control of the defendant, .such 
as the presence of vis major or the tortious act 
of a stranger. Nor .does it apply where an unex-
plained accident may be attributable to one of 
several causes, for some of which the defend()lnt 
is not responsible. It should not be allowed to 
apvp,ly whe.re, on proof of the occurrence, without 
more, the matter still rests on conjecture alone or 
the accident is just as reasonably attributable to 
ot,her causes as of negligence. In other words, if 
facts and circumstances of the occurrence give 
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rise to conflicting inferences, one leading to the 
conclusion of due care and the .other to the con-
clusion of negligence, the doctrine does not apply. 
* * * The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not ap-
plicable where the defendant has no control over 
the premises, or where there is a divided respon-
sibility and the damage may have resulted from 
a cause over which the defendant has no control.'' 
(Italics added. ) 
The rule is stated thus in Shearntan & Redfield on 
N eglig·ence, R.evised Edition, 153, Sec. 56: 
''Control is a necessary prerequisite to ap-
plication of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The rule 
is predicated amongst other things on the condi-
tion that the agency which has produced an in-
jury is within the exclusive possession, control 
and over-sight of the person sought to be charged 
with negligence.'' 
The rule is stated thus by Dean Wigmore in his very 
scholarly treatise on evidence : 
"What the final accepted shape of the rule 
[res ipsa loquitur] will be can hardly be predicted. 
But the following considerations ought to limit 
it: (1) The apparatus must be such that in the 
ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be 
expected unless from a careless ·construction, in-
spection or user; (2) both the inspection wnd user 
must have been at the time of t,he injury in the 
control of the party charged; ( 3) the injurious 
occurrence or condition must have happened ir-
respective of any voluntary action at the time by 
the party injured." (Italics added.) IX Wig-
more on Evidence, 380, Sec. 2509. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
The facts of Coca..:Cola Bottling Company vs. Row·-
lan, 16 Tenn .. A.pp. IS±, 66 S.,,~. 2d 272, have been hereto-
fore set forth in this brief, The court in tha.t case re-
jected the doctrine of res ip-sa loqui.tur as being n.ot ap-
plicable to the facts of that case, in the follo\Ying lan-
guage: 
"''T e fully agree that, in order to apply the 
rule of res ipsa loquitur, the thin_g causing the in-
jury must have been under the control and man-
agement of the defendant at the time of the casu-
alty." 
In Enloe vs. Charlotte Coca-"Cola Bottling Company, 
208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 502, the court, in rejecting the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, said: 
''That in establishing the alleged negligence 
of the manufacturer, bottler, or packer, the ~plain­
tiff is not entitled to call to his aid the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. Lamb vs. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542, 
135 S.E. 464, 29 A.L.R. 589 ; Cashwell vs. Bottling 
Works, 174 N.C. 324, 93 S.E. 901; Perry vs. Bott-
ling Company, supra [96 N.C. 175, 145 S.E. 14]; 
D·ail vs. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135, 18 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 949; Note: 47 A.L.R. 148.'' 
The Enloe case has since been consistently followed 
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See: 
Ham/p,ton vs. Thomasville Coca..JCola Bottling Com-
pany, 208 N.C. 331, 180 S.E. 584; 
Blackwell vs. ·Coca-Cola Bottling Compwny, 208 N.C. 
751, 182 S.E. 469; 
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Tickle vs. Hobgood, (N.C.) 4 S. E. 2d 444; 
Davis vs. Coca-~Cola Bottling ·Company of Asheville, 
(N.C.), 44 S.E. 2d 337; 
Evans vs .. Charlotte Pepsi Cola Company, (N.C.), 
10 S.E. 2d 707. 
The same principle is involved in cases where 
bottled beverages have exploded while in the possession 
of a retail dealer. In Wheeler vs. Laurel Bottling Works, 
11 Miss. 442, 71 So. 7 43, the court, in rejecting the doc-
trine of res ip·sa loquitur said: 
'' \V e do not think the doctrine of res ips.a lo-
quitur applies in this case. The bottle at the time 
of the injury was not under the control or man-
agement of the manufacturer. The unfortunate 
occurrence appears to be one of those unforseen 
accidents for which appellee under the facts of 
this case should not be held liable. '' 
See also Winfree v·s. Coc.a.JCola Bottling 1Works, 19 
Tenn. App·. 144, 83 S.W. 2d 903, where the court said: 
''The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only 
when the instrumentality is wholly within the pos-
session of the defendant and under its control and 
management at the time of the casualty." 
The same principle is ·also followed in cases involv.: 
ing impurities in foods. See : 
Ash vs. Child's Dining Hall CorJ'I)(pJany, 231 Mass. 86, 
120 N.E. 396; 
Jacobs vs. Childs Co., 166 N.Y.S. 798. 
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For an excellent discussion of the "Thole question of 
the necessity for defendant to have the exclusive con-
trol of the instrumentality causing the injury at the time 
of the accident in order to make the doctrine of res ipsa 
loqu.itur applicable, see Stanolind Oil and ~Gas Co. vs. 
BHnce, (\\1yo.), 62 P. 2d 1297. 
,, ... e turn no\Y to the Utah cases. 
\\T e haYe been unable to discover any Utah case 
closely similar in point of fact to the case now before 
the Court. However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
has been discussed by this court in many different cases. 
No useful purpose could be subserved by reviewing the 
Utah decisions treating this general subject. We merely 
invite the court's attention to two of the more recent 
opinions dealing with this question. 
In the case of Jenson vs. S. H. Kress & Co., (Utah), 
49 P. 2d 958, the plaintiff was injured by coming in con-
tact with a splinter of glass projecting from a showcase 
in the defendant's store. The evidence did not sho\v 
how or when the glass was cracked. This court llnani-
mously held that the doctrine of res ~psa loquitur was 
not applicable. 
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe, said: 
''There was no evidence as to how the glass 
got cracked, or how long it had been cracked be-
fore the plaintiff was cut by it. The plaintiff's 
evidence did not go any further than to show that 
the plaintiff had been injured by ~his piece of 
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glass penetrating her abdomen while she was 
brushing up against the counter. t.- * * 
"The respondent contends that a case of negli-
gence has been made out by showing that the 
piece of jagged glass penetrated her abdomen 
while she was moving along the -counter. :x· * * 
''We cannot see how this case differs from the 
Quinn Case, [Quinn vs. Utah Gas & C·oke Co., 42 
Ut. 113, 129 P. 36, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 328]. In that 
case a bottle of ink had spilled, and plaintiff's 
dress was damaged by the ink running upon it. 
In this case there was a cracked panel in the show-
case and the person of plaintiff was injured. In 
neither case did any one know ho,~.T the ink was 
spilled or the glass broken. In both cases the 
cause of the spilled ink or the broken glass may 
h·ave been caused by some representative of the 
company without negligence and unnoticed when 
it was done, or, in both cases, it may have been 
caused by the negligence of the company through 
a servant. The difficulty is thart it is in the realm 
of speculati.on, and under su.ch circumstances the 
doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur cannot apply. It 
applies where the thing from or by which the 
apparent negligence speaks is shown to be under 
the control or the management of the store and 
the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of 
things, does not or would not happen if those 
· who had the management used the proper care. 
Where the way in which the accident happened 
warrants an inference of negligence, then the 
mere happening speaks for itself. Even then it is 
only evidence from which the jury may infer 
negligence. It is not negligenGe in law. See Wil-
liamson v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah 84, 
172 P. 680, L.R.A. 1918F 588. If the circumstances 
.a:re equally consistent with .a cause which would 
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not be attributable to negligence, then the doc-
trine does not apply.'' (Italics added.) 
The facts of the case at bar may well be paralleled 
to the facts of th·e Jenson case. In the Jenson case there 
was no evidence as to ho'v the glass 'vas cracked, or 
how long it had been cracked, before the ·plaintiff was 
cut by it. In the case at bar, there is no evidence as to 
how the impure matter got into the bottle of Coca-Cola, 
or for how long it had been there at the time the plain-
tiff drank from the bottle. In both cases the plain tiff's 
evidence \Yent no further than to show the injury. In 
both cases the circumstances of the injury \Vere such 
that the injury might be as well attributed to causes for 
which the defendant would not be responsible as to 
causes for which the defendant would be responsible. 
In the Jenson case it was held that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur was not applicable, and a similar result 
should follow in the case at bar. 
In the recent case of Loos vs .. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, (Ut.), 108 P. 2d 254, in an action by the plain-
tiff against the gas company for injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff as a result of an explosion of gas in a cer-
tain cabin of the Utah Motor Park, it was held that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be enforced 
against the gas company because it did not have any 
control over the gas facilities where the explosion oc-
curred. In that case, employees of the gas company 
went on the premis-es of the Utah Motor Park only by 
invitation. In the case at bar, employees of the defendant 
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company went on the premises of the American Smelting 
& Refining Company only at the invitation of the An1-
erican Smelting & Refining Company. They had no con-
trol over the vending machine from which the plaintiff 
purchased the bottle of Coca-Cola. That machine was 
leased to the American Smelting & Refining Company, 
and was under its exclusive control. 
From the foregoing authorities it is apparent that 
the trial court erred in submitting this case to the jury 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is clearly 
not applicable to the facts of this case. 
D. THE EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT IS 
SO OVERWHELMING AS TO REQUIRE A HOLDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
We have heretofore argued at some length that the 
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to put to 
the jury on the question of negligence. If the court 
agrees with our argument in that respect, it will be un-
necessary for the court to consider the '' D'' portion of 
our argument under this point. However, -without jn 
any way waiving our contentions under ''A,'' '' B, '' and 
"C," of Point 1, we deem it advisable to present this 
additional argument to the court in the event that the 
court should not agree with our earlier contentions. 
We have pointed out at some length in our state-
ment of facts the great pains and extent to which the 
defendant company went to insure that no impure prod-
ucts should be bottled by the defendant. Not only was 
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there extensive testimony by tht:• defendant's Plnployee, 
~Ir. Peter Hanes, as to the n1eticulous care \Vith which 
bottles are "\vashed, filled and inspected, but there is also 
very strong corroborating testimony on the part of three 
disinterested expert "\Yitnesses, Mr. Raymond 'Vilmert, 
Dr. Louis R. Curtis, and ~Ir. J. T. Holding. The testi-
mony of these men "\Yas to the effect that it would be vir-
tually impossible for a bottle containing dead flies to go 
through the defendant's washing and bottling process 
and through its double inspection system and reach the 
open market. The plaintiff attempted in vain to dis-
credit the testimony of these 'vitnesses. No question 
could be raised as to their expert qualifications nor as 
to their freedom from bias. The plaintiff did not come 
forward with any rebuttal testimony tending in any way 
to discredit in any respect the testimony of any of these 
witnesses. 
It is the position of the defendant that if there were 
flies in the bottle from which the plaintiff drank (which 
fact we assume to be true), either the bottle was bottled 
by some bottler other than the defendant, or else those 
flies were ~placed in that bottle by some mischief-minded 
third person after the bottle passed from the possession 
and control of the defendant and into the control of 
American Smelting & Refining Co. In view of the over-
whelming evidence presented by the defendant as to the 
care exercised by it in its bottling process, no other con-
clusion is tenable. We do not concede that it would be 
possible for flies to get into a bottle of Coca-Cola during 
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any phase of the washing and bottling operations car-
ried on by the defendant. 
We also wish to point out to the court that the de-
fendant is not liable as an insurer. The only duty im-
posed upon the defendant is the exercise of reasonable 
care. While we readily concede that reasonable care in 
the case of a person bottling beverages for human con-
sumption would involve a very high degree of diligence, 
we submit that the highest possible degree of diligence 
and care has been exercised by the defendant in this 
case. Assuming, "rithout in any way conceding, that flies 
and other impurities got into the bottle of Coca-Cola 
from which the plaintiff drank, during the defendant's 
bottling lJ·rocess, such an event would have to be attribu-
ted to inevitable accident, and not to negligence on the 
part of the defendant. What further care could pos-
sibly have been exercised by the defendant~ Wherein 
can the defendant be said to have breeched its duty1 
What possible further step could have been taken by 
the defendant to insure that its :products would be 
wholesome and fit for human consumption~ The plain-
tiff has failed to come forward with even a suggestion 
as to what additional care the defendant might exercise 
for the greater protection of the consumers of its 
product. The evidence is overwhelming and uncontra-
dicted that the bottling and washing process employed 
by the defendant is safe, and is the best known to man. 
The evidence is equally clear that the inspection pro-
cedure of the defendant is as "fool-proof" as the in-
genuity of man can devise. If, then, by some wild stretch 
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of the imagination, it could be said that the flies did get 
into the bottle ''Thile it \Yas in the possession and control 
of the defendant, that event must be charged to inevitable 
accident. It can in no wise be said that the defendant 
failed in the performance of its duty to exercise the 
highest degree of diligence and to assure that its 
product reached the market in a safe, sanitary and 
wholesome condition. 'fhese views have been followed by 
the courts in similar cases. 
In Coca-Cola Bottling Company vs. Rowlan, 16 Tenn. 
App. 184, 66 S.W. 2d 272, the defendant produced evi-
dence as to its washing and bottling process quite similar 
to the evidence of the defendant in the case at bar. The 
washing process employed by the defendant in that case 
was very similar to that employed by this defendant. 
However, in that case the defendant produced no evi-
dence of an electric eye inspection machine, whereas in 
the case at bar the defendant produced evidence of this 
additional safety factor. 
Said the court in the Rowlan case : 
''Without discussing the facts as disclosed by 
the record further, we are of the opinion that the 
plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant was 
guilty of any negligence in this matter of bottling 
Coca-Cola. To the contrary, we think that under 
the facts of the record, it would have been physi-
cally impossible for a dead mouse to have been 
hottled up in the Coca-Cola at the plant. 
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"We are constrained to reach the conclusion 
that there was no proof of negligence, and that 
~any p~resurnption that may have been created by 
the mere finding of a dead mouse in the bottle of 
Coca-Cola is fully met by the evidence in the na-
ture of physical facts introduced by the defendant 
and hence the physical facts as sho\vn by the man-
ner in which the Coca-Cola was processed make it 
not ·only highly improbable, but ~practically im-
possible for the mouse to have been in the bottle 
at the time it was filled with Coca-Cola, and de-
livered to the stand for sale.'' 
The Court also quoted with approval from Crigger 
v. :Coca-~Cola Bottling Company, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.\V .... 
155: 
''That he who prepares and puts on the mar-
ket in bottles or sealed packages, food, drugs, bev-
erages, medicines or articles inherently danger-
ous, owes a high duty to the public in the care and 
preparation of such commodities, and that a lia-
bility will exist regardless of privity of contract 
to anyone injured for a failure to prop~erly safe-
guard and perform that duty. * * * 
"This liability is based on an o1nission of 
duty or an .act of negligence and the way should 
be left op~en for the innocent to escape. However 
exacting the duty or high the degree of care to 
furnish pure foods, beverages and medicines, we 
believe with Judge Cooley as expressed in Brown 
vs. Marshall * * * [47 Mich. 576, 11 N.W. 392], 
that negligence is a necess~ary element in the 
right of action and the better authorities have not 
gone so far as to dispense with actual negligence 
as a prerequisite to the liability. In fact, there is 
no logical basis for liability for personal injury 
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without some negligent act or omission." (Italics 
added.) 
The foregoing quotation 'Yas also quoted with ap-
proval in ;]Jerri.man vs .. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., (Tenn.), 
68 S.W. 2d 149. The san1e thought "~as also expressed in 
Enloe vs. Charlotte ·Coca...,Cola Bottling Co., supra. See 
also Blaclf!lcell vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 208 N.C. 
751, 182 S.E. 469, and Horn & H. Baking Company vs. 
Lieber, supra. 
See also 38 Am. Jur. 1005, Negligence, Sec. 308, 
where it is said : 
"In no event, however, will the applic-ation of 
this doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] affect the broad, 
well settled, rule that when the evidence is so 
clear and convincing that reasonable minds would 
not differ in their conclusions therefrom, the ques-
tion of defendant's negligence is for the court 
and not for the jury.'' 
And, to the same effect, see 38 Am. Jur .. 1063, Negli-
gence, Sec. 335. 
We submit that the defendant conclusively demon-
strated that its washing and bottling process was the 
best and safest devisable by the ingenuity of man, and 
that no further steps to safeguard life, health and safety 
of the consuming public could have been taken by the 
defendant, and it must therefore be held as a matter of 
law that the defendant was free of negligence. 
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POINT 2. 
PLAINTIF·F'S ATTORNEY \\TAS GUILTY OF 
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR SUCH AS TO REQUIRE THE SETTING 
ASIDE OF THE VER.DICT AND JUSTIFYING AN 
ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL. 
During the cross-examination of Peter I-Ianes, 
counsel for the plaintiff asked the \vitness the following 
question: 
"I notice that your attorney is checking your 
questions quite carefully with the transcript. Have 
you testified a good deal in these eases ~ '' 
Objections were promptly interposed by the defendant, 
and the court struck the question and the answer and 
instructed the jury to disregard it. (R. 132.) 
Notwithstanding the court's ruling that any refer-
ence to· other trials was improper, counsel for the plain-
tiff persisted in seeking to inject into the record the 
notion that the defendant company was frequently called 
up·on to defend suits of this nature. 
Again at R. 144, counsel for the plaintiff, on cross-
examination of Raymond Wilmert, asked this question: 
''If the Coca-Cola Company should lose a few 
of these lawsuits * * * '' 
Again objection was interposed. Counsel for the plain-
tiff did not persist in the question at that time, but 
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shortly thereafter, on re-cross-examination of Mr. J. T. 
Holding, counsel asked the \Yi tness : 
''You haYe been subpoenaed before to testify 
in these cases for ~fr. Moreton, haven't you~'' 
(R. 159.) 
Again objection was ·promptly interposed and again the 
court sustained the objection and struck it from the 
record, and instructed the jury to disregard it. 
The only apparent purpose for such questions could 
be to conYey to the jury the impression that the defend-
ant was frequently called upon to defend la\vsuits in-
volving impure products. Counsel persisted in attem.p.t-
ing to put this notion before the jury although the court 
consistently, and quite correctly, ruled that such matters 
were entirely improper. While there is no way of show-
ing that the jury was influenced, or was not influenced, 
by these irrelevant rna tters, it is only fair to assume that 
such had a prejudicial effect upon the defense interposed 
by the defendant. 
It must be remembered that the defense relied upon 
principally by the defendant was that its bottling process 
was so efficient and so perfect that it would be impos-
sible for impure or foreign materials to get into its 
bottled p~roduct. Insinuations that the defendant was 
frequently called upon to defend suits of this nature 
would naturally cause the jury to believe that the process 
was not as efficient as testified to by the defendant's 
witnesses. 
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It is a well recognized rule that misconduct on the 
part of counsel such as results in the opposite party 
being denied a fair trial, is prejudicial error and grounds 
for granting of a new trial or reversal on appeal. Thus 
it is said in 39 Am. Jur. 71, New Trial, Sec. 53: 
''Misconduct of counsel for ·one p·arty, if of 
such a nature as to influence a verdict in favor 
of that party, or to prevent the -adverse party 
from having a fair trial is, if proper and timely 
objection thereto is made, ground for a new trial. 
* • • Where there is any misconduct on the part 
of counsel for the prevailing party which appears 
to have been liable, even though not intended to 
have ·a pernicious effect upon legal proceedings, 
or a prevailing influence on the jury, there is 
reason for treating the trial as a mistrial and 
directing that the judgment be set aside.'' 
And at :page 72, Sec. 54 it is said : 
"Improp.er remarks and comments of counsel 
for a party, made in the presence and hearing of 
the jury, if of such ch·aracter as to influence a ver-
dict, prevent a fair trial, etc., may, when the 
complaining party has made proper and timely 
objection and sought to have the harmful effect 
thereof removed by an instruction to the Jury, 
furnish good grounds for a new trial.'' 
See also 3 Am. Jur. 608, Appeal and Error, Sec. 1060, 
where it is said: 
''Thus, it has been held reversible error for 
counsel in examining witnesses, to bring before 
the jury irrelevant evidence of colla ter·al rna tters 
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for the purpose of prejudicing, or tending to 
prejudice, the jury against the opposing parties, 
as~ for example, in a negligence action, the fact 
that the defendant is insured. '*' * * 
''Asking the opposing party questions which 
he knows to be wholly improper, in order to place 
before the jury inadmissible evidence, and at-
tempting to introduce previously excluded evi-
dence by making statements of ·alleged facts in 
asking questions of witnesses may also be re-
versible error.'' 
It is interesting to observe that in recent years there 
has been an increasing tendency on the part of attorneys 
to bring improper matters before the jury by ingenious 
and devious methods. In 39 Am .. Jur. 80, New Trial, Sec. 
65, it is said: 
''Misconduct of counsel may consist in at-
tempting to get before the jury matters not in 
issue and not properly matters for the considera-
tion of the jury by means of asking witnesses im-
proper questions or making improper offers of 
rproof. In recent years there has been a decided 
increase in the number of cases in which com-
plaint has been made of prejudice suffered by 
reason of such misconduct, and frequently a new 
trial is sought and granted on this ground, par-
ticularly where an attorney persistently pursues 
a wholly unjustified and prejudicial course of in-
terrogation, notwithstanding the objections made 
by counsel for the opposing party litigant and 
sustained by the court.'' 
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And at page 81 it is said: 
"Unsupported statements of fact which have 
been made by counsel for the prevailing party in 
the presence of the jury, and which were prejudi-
cial to the opposing party, will also afford cause 
for a new trial. ' ' 
The same thought is expressed in the excellent an-
notation on this question in 109 A.L.R. 1089 where it is 
said: 
''An examination of the case digests shows 
that in the last twenty ye·ars there has been a 
decided increase in the percentage of jury cases 
wherein complaint has been made of :prejudice suf-
fered by reason of the misconduct of counsel in 
the examination of witnesses. Much of this mis-
conduct has consisted of knowingly asking im-
proper questions. In many cases the attorney 
complained of has :persistently pursued a wholly 
unjustified ·and prejudicial course of interroga-
tion, notwithstanding objections made and sus-
tained, clearly called to his attention, if such a 
thing could be deemed necessary, that the ques-
tions asked were without any plausible legal foun-
dation. Reversals have frequently been granted 
in cases of that extreme character.'' 
And at page 1096, by way of summary of the anno-
tation, it is said: 
"In fine, one may say that the extent to which, 
in jury trials, the practice of knowingly asking 
witnesses improper and prejudicial questions has 
come to be indulged in, indicates the need for a 
policy which will make the I}ractice unprofitable. 
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The fact that attorneys have e·arnestly argued 
that they are entitled to the 'benefit' before the 
jury of their opponent's action in objecting to 
such questions is significant of the extent to which 
fidelity to the ideal of justice has yielded to the 
unbridled notion that the administration of the 
law is a game in vvhich victory belongs to him who 
is most ingenious in turning the existing rules to 
his advantage. Verdicts so gained should not be 
retained. To use the language of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, 'No litigant should be permitted 
to profit by such J?Tactice.' '' 
We have been unable to discover a case exactly in 
point with the facts of the case at bar. Perhaps the 
closest is Louisville .cf Nashville R.ailway Co. v. Payne, 
133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352, 19 Ann. Cases 294. In that 
case, plaintiff's counsel repeatedly asked incompetent 
questions attempting to establish that the servants in 
charge of the defendant's trains on other occasions had 
been guilty of acts of negligence similar in character to 
that for which recovery was sought in that case. In re-
versing the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky said: 
'' * * * in a case like that here p·resented, 
where counsel persistently pursues a line of in-
terrogation which the court rules to be wrong, 
and which one reasonably well acquainted with 
the rules governing the ·admission of evidence 
must know to be improper, the conclusion is ir-
resistable that it is done for the purpose of in-
fluencing and prejudicing the minds of the jury in 
arriving at a verdict. No court should counten-
ance such conduct ; and, when the trial judge, be-
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cause of his kindness of heart, or long-suffering 
and forbearing nature, ;permits it to go unpun-
ished, there remains nothing to do but deprive 
the one offending of the fruits of his victory thus 
earned. This case must be reversed for other 
reasons; but, if there were none such, this mis-
conduct upon the part of plaintiff's counsel would 
furnish abundant grounds for reversal. 
"Where the record shows that an attorney 
persistently and dogmatically pursues a line of 
interrogation over the objection of opposing 
counsel and the adverse ruling of the court to the 
extent here shown, the conclusion is irresistable 
that such was not due to error of judgment, but 
in pursuance of a determination to present the 
matter about which the questions are asked to 
the jury in spite of court and counsel. Such 
conduct should neither be tolerated nor excused 
by the trial court, and no litigant should be per-
mitted to profit by such practice.'' 
For other authorities supporting the same general 
rule, see 6 Ann. Cases 224, 19 Ann. Cases 296, A1~n. Cases 
1917A 441. 
It is with some reluctance that we have urged this 
point upon the court and, in so doing, we do not wish to 
be understood as accusing counsel for the plaintiff of 
deliberate bad faith. However, regardless of the motives 
that may have prompted him in bringing these irrelevant 
matters before the jury, it can only be fair to assume 
that the jury was imp~roperly influenced and that .such 
conduct redounded to the prejudice of the defendant. 
Verdicts gained by the aid of such method should not be 
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retained. As said by the Kentucky Supreme Court in 
the case of Louis-ville & Nashville R .. Co. v·. Payne, supra: 
''No litigant should be permitted to p~rofit by 
such practice.'' 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the record contains 
no evidence whatsoever of any negligence on the part of 
the defendant, but that, on the contrary, the record con-
clusively shows that the defendant exercised the highest 
possible degree of care in the bottling of its product. 
Therefore the judgment of the Trial Court should 
be set aside and the Trial Court directed to enter a judg-
ment in favor of the defendant, no cause of action. 
It is further submitted that the misconduct on the 
part of plaintiff's counsel resulted in the defendant be-
ing denied fair trial. 
ResJJectfully, 
MoRETON, CHRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN, 
ELIAS L. DAY 
Attorneys for Defendant .and Appellant. 
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